Medhatithi’s reference to the anumeya veda (Inferred Veda)

Medhatithi’s reference to the anumeya veda (Inferred Veda)

The Mānava-Dharmaśāstra verse 1.3 begins with the statement of the rṣis to Manu that he possesses the kāryatattvārtha (the artha [meaning] which has kārya [imperative work] as its tattva [essence]) of the entire vidhāna (body of rules).

Medhātithi glosses vidhāna as śāstra, that by which actions are enjoined (vidhīyante’nena karmāṇi). This vidhāna is the Veda, as understood by the qualification svayambhū (self-existent) in the verse, which, according to Medhātithi, alludes to the nature of the text as nitya (eternal), akṛtaka (not created) and apauruṣeya (not of human origin).

Now, the commentary suggests that the ‘entirety’ of the vidhāna refers to the pratyakṣākṣara (perceived or literal word) and anumeyākṣara (inferred or metaphorical word). In other words, Manu is deemed to be aware of not only the actions that have been explicitly ordained by the Veda but also those actions that could be regarded as implicitly prescribed by it even though they are not stated therein. It is the exposition of the anumeyākṣara that suggests the concept of an anumeya veda (inferred Veda). 

As an example of the pratyakṣākṣara, we have the following: agnihotram juhuyād ayaṃ sahasramānava ity etayā āhavanīyam upatiṣṭhate “approaches the āhavanīya with the [mantra] ‘the agnihotra should be performed, it pertains to thousand men’.” Here, by the use of the instrumental case of etayā (with this), the Veda directly (pratyakṣa) employs the mantra in case of the āhavanīya.

In case of aṣṭakāḥ kartavyā “the aṣṭakas should be performed,” the Veda is inferred by the smṛti. I think it means that aṣṭakāḥ kartavyā is a smṛti injunction and it is inferred that it must have its basis in the Veda, though it is not clear how. A more detailed example of an inferential proposition is with regards to the cutting of barhis (the sacred grass).

There is a mantra barhir devasadanaṃ dāmi iti which Jha translates as “I am chopping grass, the seat of the [g]ods.” I think dāmi derived from the root dā should mean “give” but I will go with Jha’s translation as it makes better sense in the context, as we will see. Medhātithi says that in case of the mantra, the form (liṅga) indicates that it should be employed during the cutting of barhis. This is an example of inference from śruti.  

This mantra occurs in the darśapūrṇamāsa context (prakaraṇa) and the cutting of barhis is enjoined (āmnāta) there. However, it is not stated that the barhis should be cut “with” the mantra. A brief aside on the instrumental relation between the action and the mantra. I assume it refers to the incantation of the mantra while performing the action. Thus, it is stated that approach the āhavanīya “with” the mantra agnihotram juhuyād, &c. meaning utter the mantra while approaching the āhavanīya. In this sense, it is not stated that the barhis should be cut “with” the mantra barhir devasadanaṃ &c.

However, the form (rūpa) of the mantra is capable of illuminating the cutting of barhis. I suspect that prakāśana-sāmarthya is a technical term in relation to a mantra and suggests its power of illumination or of providing an experience that is suggestive of illumination. Since the mantra occurs in the context (prakaraṇa) of darśapūrṇamāsa its connection with this ritual is established. By its own power (sāmarthya), the cutting of barhis is endorsed. This is the pratīti (what follows therefrom): “The darśapūrṇamāsa should be performed ‘with’ this mantra.” But how? yathā śaknuyād “in the manner in which it is capable of being used.” If [the application] of a thing is not stated, then its śakti (power, capacity) can provide a hint i.e. if you do not know the use of something but if you do know what it can do, then you may assume that it is intended to be used to do what it can do. We understand from the passage that a mantra possesses the śakti or sāmarthya of illuminating an action by its form – rūpa or liṅga – and you perform the action it illuminates “with” the mantra. In this case, the mantra is capable of illuminating the cutting of barhis.

Thus, from the context (prakaraṇa) and its own sāmarthya, the śabda (word, but preferably ‘instruction’?), “by this mantra he cuts barhis” enters the mind (that is a literal translation of buddhau śabda āgacchati). The a priori (pūrva) śabda is followed by (pratīyate, so rather “understood as”) the savikalpa-vijñāna (object cognition). This śabda located in the mind (buddhi) is termed as the anumeya veda (the inferred Veda). Its vedatva (that it is Veda) is on account of it being raised (utthāpita) by its own sāmarthya [of illuminating the action of cutting barhis] concerned with other śruti passages such as the darśapūrṇamāsa statement [wherein the cutting of barhis is ordained] and the mantra statement. This is the view of the Kumārila school.

Summarily, the mantra barhir devasadanaṃ dāmi occurs in the Veda in the darśapūrṇamāsa section. The darśapūrṇamāsa entails the cutting of barhis. But should the barhis be cut “with” the mantra? Yes, even if it has not been explicitly stated as such as a pratyakṣākṣara, because it is an implied śabda, an anumeyākṣara, which arises from the śakti of the mantra to illuminate the entailed action. Manu’s expertise of the Vedas is thus eulogized as being so comprehensive as to include all that is visibly and inferentially commanded by the text.