Medhatithi’s reference to the anumeya veda (Inferred Veda)
The Mānava-Dharmaśāstra verse 1.3 begins with the
statement of the rṣis to Manu that he possesses the kāryatattvārtha
(the artha [meaning] which has kārya [imperative work] as its tattva
[essence]) of the entire vidhāna (body of rules).
Medhātithi glosses vidhāna as śāstra, that by
which actions are enjoined (vidhīyante’nena karmāṇi). This vidhāna
is the Veda, as understood by the qualification svayambhū
(self-existent) in the verse, which, according to Medhātithi, alludes to the
nature of the text as nitya (eternal), akṛtaka (not created) and apauruṣeya
(not of human origin).
Now, the commentary suggests that the ‘entirety’ of the vidhāna
refers to the pratyakṣākṣara (perceived or literal word) and anumeyākṣara
(inferred or metaphorical word). In other words, Manu is deemed to be aware of
not only the actions that have been explicitly ordained by the Veda but also
those actions that could be regarded as implicitly prescribed by it even though
they are not stated therein. It is the exposition of the anumeyākṣara
that suggests the concept of an anumeya veda (inferred Veda).
As an example of the pratyakṣākṣara, we have the
following: agnihotram juhuyād ayaṃ sahasramānava ity etayā āhavanīyam upatiṣṭhate
“approaches the āhavanīya with the [mantra] ‘the agnihotra should
be performed, it pertains to thousand men’.” Here, by the use of the
instrumental case of etayā (with this), the Veda directly (pratyakṣa)
employs the mantra in case of the āhavanīya.
In case of aṣṭakāḥ kartavyā “the aṣṭakas
should be performed,” the Veda is inferred by the smṛti. I think it
means that aṣṭakāḥ kartavyā is a smṛti injunction and it is
inferred that it must have its basis in the Veda, though it is not clear how. A
more detailed example of an inferential proposition is with regards to the
cutting of barhis (the sacred grass).
There is a mantra barhir devasadanaṃ dāmi iti which
Jha translates as “I am chopping grass, the seat of the [g]ods.” I think dāmi
derived from the root dā should mean “give” but I will go with Jha’s
translation as it makes better sense in the context, as we will see. Medhātithi
says that in case of the mantra, the form (liṅga) indicates that it
should be employed during the cutting of barhis. This is an example of
inference from śruti.
This mantra occurs in the darśapūrṇamāsa context (prakaraṇa)
and the cutting of barhis is enjoined (āmnāta) there. However, it
is not stated that the barhis should be cut “with” the mantra. A brief
aside on the instrumental relation between the action and the mantra. I assume
it refers to the incantation of the mantra while performing the action. Thus,
it is stated that approach the āhavanīya “with” the mantra agnihotram
juhuyād, &c. meaning utter the mantra while approaching the āhavanīya.
In this sense, it is not stated that the barhis should be cut “with” the
mantra barhir devasadanaṃ &c.
However, the form (rūpa) of the mantra is capable of
illuminating the cutting of barhis. I suspect that prakāśana-sāmarthya
is a technical term in relation to a mantra and suggests its power of
illumination or of providing an experience that is suggestive of illumination.
Since the mantra occurs in the context (prakaraṇa) of darśapūrṇamāsa
its connection with this ritual is established. By its own power (sāmarthya),
the cutting of barhis is endorsed. This is the pratīti (what
follows therefrom): “The darśapūrṇamāsa should be performed ‘with’ this
mantra.” But how? yathā śaknuyād “in the manner in which it is capable
of being used.” If [the application] of a thing is not stated, then its śakti
(power, capacity) can provide a hint i.e. if you do not know the use of something
but if you do know what it can do, then you may assume that it is intended to
be used to do what it can do. We understand from the passage that a mantra possesses
the śakti or sāmarthya of illuminating an action by its form – rūpa
or liṅga – and you perform the action it illuminates “with” the mantra.
In this case, the mantra is capable of illuminating the cutting of barhis.
Thus, from the context (prakaraṇa) and its own sāmarthya,
the śabda (word, but preferably ‘instruction’?), “by this mantra he cuts
barhis” enters the mind (that is a literal translation of buddhau
śabda āgacchati). The a priori (pūrva) śabda is followed by (pratīyate,
so rather “understood as”) the savikalpa-vijñāna (object cognition). This
śabda located in the mind (buddhi) is termed as the anumeya
veda (the inferred Veda). Its vedatva (that it is Veda) is on
account of it being raised (utthāpita) by its own sāmarthya [of
illuminating the action of cutting barhis] concerned with other śruti
passages such as the darśapūrṇamāsa statement [wherein the cutting of barhis
is ordained] and the mantra statement. This is the view of the Kumārila school.
Summarily, the mantra barhir devasadanaṃ dāmi occurs
in the Veda in the darśapūrṇamāsa section. The darśapūrṇamāsa
entails the cutting of barhis. But should the barhis be cut
“with” the mantra? Yes, even if it has not been explicitly stated as such as a pratyakṣākṣara,
because it is an implied śabda, an anumeyākṣara, which arises
from the śakti of the mantra to illuminate the entailed action. Manu’s
expertise of the Vedas is thus eulogized as being so comprehensive as to
include all that is visibly and inferentially commanded by the text.
